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1 INTRODUCTION
The Freedom Charter1 declared many years ago that “(t)he People shall govern”. 
When the constitutional drafters devised a legislative system for our democracy 
they might have had this slogan in mind. South Africa’s constitutional democ-
racy is representative and participatory in its nature. The representative aspect 
embraces multi-party democracy, achieved through regular elections based on 
a common voters’ roll and proportional representation;2 the participatory aspect 
goes further than regular elections every five years in that it guarantees involve-
ment of each citizen in public life in between elections. These two aspects 
should not be seen as conflicting with each other but as complementary. To this 
extent public participation is linked to the right to political participation. The 
right to political participation in terms of international law3 has expressly recog-
nised the right to participate in public life. In other words, public participation 
in the legislative process is an integral part of any democracy.
In the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa4 (“the Constitution”) the 
right to vote5 at regular elections guarantees a democratically elected government 
1 The Freedom Charter adopted at the Congress of the People, Kliptown 1955.
2 Motala & Ramaphosa Constitutional Law: Analysis and cases (2002) 9.
3 South Africa adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on 3 October 1994 
and ratified it on 10 December 1998.
  Article 25 reads as follows:
  Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity , without any of the distinctions mentioned 
in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
 (a)  to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
 (b)  to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal 
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the 
electors.” 
4 Formerly known as Act 108 of 1996.
5 S 19 (2) provides: Every citizen has the right to free, fair and regular elections for any legislative body 
established in terms of the Constitution.
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that is accountable,6 responsive and open7. The Constitution also specifies that 
the National Assembly, which is elected by the people, must ensure “govern-
ment by the people under the Constitution … by providing a national forum for 
public consideration of issues”.8 It is sections 59(1)(a), 72(1)(a) and 118(1)(a)9 
of the Constitution that establish public participation in the legislative process. 
When the public can participate in the legislative process, individually or as 
a collective, it signifies that everyone is regarded as significant and that their 
opinions are taken into consideration by the government.10
The Constitutional Court (“the Court”) has on previous occasions been 
called upon to analyse and clarify the nature and extent of the obligation to 
“facilitate public involvement” in legislation and other processes placed upon 
legislative bodies by the Constitution. Most recently the Court addressed this 
issue in the case of Merafong Demarcation Forum and Others v President of 
Republic of South Africa and Others.11 This article examines the extent to which 
public participation in the legislative process is protected in the Constitution 
and more specifically, in light of the Merafong case, the justiciability of this 
right through the courts.
2  THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO FACILITATE PUBLIC 
INVOLVEMENT
Under previous regimes the majority of South Africans were excluded from 
public life;12 in particular, they were denied the right to vote. In breaking from 
the old, sections 59(1)(a), 72(1)(a) and 118(1)(a)13 introduce a constitutional 
duty on National Assembly, the National Council of Provinces and provincial 
legislatures respectively to facilitate public participation when executing their 
legislative processes.
Even though legislative bodies have discretion in determining what pro cesses 
and procedures will be utilised to facilitate public involvement, the Constitu-
tional Court set out a test in Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of 
6 S 41 (1) (c) provides
  All spheres of government and organs of the state within each sphere must provide effective, 
transparent, accountable and coherent government for the Republic as a whole.
7 One of the values in the founding provisions of the Constitution is stipulated in section 1 (d) as 
Universal suffrage, a national common voters’ roll, regular elections and multi-party system of 
democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.
8 S42 (3):
The National Assembly is elected to represent the people and to ensure government by the people under 
the Constitution. It does this by choosing the President, by providing a national forum for public 
consideration of issues….
9 S 59(1)(a)The National Assembly must- (a) facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other 
processes of the Assembly and its committees; …
  S 72(1)(a) The National Council of Provinces must- (a) facilitate public involvement in the legisla-
tive and other processes of the Council and its committees; …
  S 118(1)(a) A provincial legislature must- (a) facilitate public involvement in the legislative and 
other processes of the legislature and its committees; …
10 S v Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC), per O’Regan J, para 329.
11 [2008] ZACC 10
12 Brink v Kitshoff 1996 (6) BCLR 752 (CC) para 40.
13 See fn 9 above
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the National Assembly.14 The issues before the Court in the Doctors for Life 
International case were (i) what the nature of the duty to facilitate public par-
ticipation is; (ii) whether the legislature had discharged its duty to facilitate 
public involvement in the legislative process of certain health related legislation; 
and (iii) what the impact on the validity of such legis lation if the facilitation of 
public involvement was flawed is. The test set is whether the legislature acted 
reasonably in discharging the duty to facilitate public involvement. The follow-
ing factors would also be taken into account in determining reasonableness: (i) 
the nature of the legislation concerned; (ii) the importance of the legislation; 
(iii) intensity of the impact on the public15, and other relevant factors which will 
depend on the circumstances of each case. Furthermore, at least two elements 
are encompassed by the duty to facilitate public involvement; first, to provide 
meaningful opportunities for public participation in the law-making process 
and secondly, to make sure that people have the ability to take advantage of 
the opportunities provided. 16 Sachs J, concurring with the majority judgment, 
emphasised the “special meaning”17 of public participation within our democ-
racy and said the effect of public participation should be that:
“All parties interested in legislation should feel that they have been given a real oppor-
tunity to have their say, that they are taken seriously as citizens and that their views 
matter and will receive due consideration at the moments when they could possibly influ-
ence decisions in a meaningful fashion. The objective is both symbolical and practical: 
the persons concerned must be manifestly shown the respect due to them as concerned 
citizens, and the legislators must have the benefit of all inputs that will enable them to 
produce the best possible laws”. 18
This judgment clearly breaks away from the history that saw arbitrary legis-
lative decision and the marginalisation of the majority of South Africans. 
This also creates an impression that the Constitutional Court is serious about 
addressing the “injustices of the past” and more importantly that the legislature 
should be accountable to the people who elected them. Doctors for Life set the 
standard of the constitutional obligation to facilitate public participation, but 
a fully fleshed out understanding was to be developed by later jurisprudence. 
Keeping in mind South African history, one would hope for constitutional 
protection to be given against arbitrary enactment of legislation.
3  PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN CHANGING A PROVINCIAL 
BOUNDARY
South Africa has a history of forced removals, issues pertaining to the pass 
laws and freedom of movement where Bantustan policies were used to 
entrench19, deepen and widen the divide between rich and poor, urban and 
rural, different races and between classes of citizens.20 With the realisation 
that the administration of cross-boundary municipalities was fraught with 
14 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC)
15 Doctors for Life International (fn 14 above) para 128. 
16 Doctors for Life International (fn 14 above) para 129.
17 Doctors for Life International (fn 14 above) per Sachs, para 226.





difficulty21, government, in abolishing them, had to apply caution as tempers 
might flare (as the community of Merafong Municipality amply demonstrates) 
if people perceive that they are not adequately consulted as was done with 
the legislation such as the Group Areas Act22.
In Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others23 the constitutional issue was whether the correct procedure 
was followed when the legislature sought to pass the Twelfth Constitutional 
Amendment that would in effect alter the provincial boundaries of KwaZulu-
Natal and the Eastern Cape. The Appellants challenged the constitutionality 
of the Constitution’s Twelfth Amendment Act of 2005 (Twelfth Amendment), 
as well as of the Cross-boundary Municipalities Laws and Repeal Related 
Matters Act 23 of 2005 on grounds that the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legis-
lature had failed in discharging its duty to facilitate public involvement and 
therefore Acts were not passed according to the Constitutional provisions.24
Section 74(3)(b)(ii) sets out the procedure to be followed in altering a pro-
vincial boundary. The provincial legislature(s) province(s) concerned have to 
approve the Bill or part of the Bill that specifically concerns their province25; 
this affords the province concerned an opportunity to protect its territorial 
integrity.26 As the two provinces affected, the KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern 
Cape Provincial Legislature had to comply with section 74(8), however unlike 
the Eastern Cape; KwaZulu-Natal did not take any steps to involve the public 
in its decision to support the boundary change. In its decision the Court said:
“[T]he KwaZulu-Natal legislature was required to approve that part of the Twelfth Amend-
ment that transfers the area that previously formed Matatiele Local Municipality from the 
province of KwaZulu-Natal to the Eastern Cape. The Constitution contemplates that the 
approval in terms of section 74(8) will be given by a provincial legislature concerned after 
complying with the provisions of section 118(1)(a)”.27 (my emphasis)
From the quote above it is evident why the court, in applying the test 
develop ed in Doctors for Life International, found the decision by the pro-
vincial legislature to be invalid. 28 What can be learnt from this case is that 
compliance with provisions that provide for public participation is a neces-
21 Memorandum to the President’s Coordinating Council, 1 November 2002: Administration of Cross-
Boundary Municipalities.
22 41 of 1950
23 Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2006 ZACC 
12, Matatiele 2.
24 S 74(3)(b)(ii).
 “(3) Any other provision of the Constitution may be amended by a Bill passed–
 (a)  by the National Assembly, with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members; and
 (b)  also by the National Council of Provinces, with a supporting vote of at least six provinces, if the 
 amendment–
          (ii) alters provincial boundaries, powers, functions or institutions;… 
25 S 74(8) of the Constitution
  If a Bill referred to in subsection (3) (b), or any part of the Bill, concerns only a specific province 
or provinces, the National Council of Provinces may not pass the Bill or the relevant part unless it 
has been approved by the legislature or legislatures of the province.
26 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) para 233. 
27 Matatiele 2 (fn 22 above) para 85.
28 Matatiele 2 (fn 21 above) para 89
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sary accompaniment in the legislative process particularly if the legislation 
has such importance as the alteration of a provincial boundary.
4  MERAFONG DEMARCATION FORUM AND OTHERS v 
PRESIDENT OF REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA AND 
OTHERS29
In a bid to abolish cross-boundary municipalities two Bills30 were passed in 
the National Assembly and, according to section 74, the legislative process 
was to be completed in the National Council of Provinces. The following was 
stated in relation to Merafong Municipality as an example of this concern:
“Merafong City Local Municipality is to be excluded from the municipal area of the West 
Rand District Municipality and included in the municipal area of the Southern District 
Municipality. Westonaria is to remain in the West Rand District Municipality”.31
In compliance with the requirements of the Constitution it was therefore neces-
sary to arrange public participation on the aforementioned legislation under 
section 118(1)(a). The events played out as follows: the Gauteng Provincial 
Legislature, through a Portfolio Committee, and the North West Provincial 
Legislature engaged on the issue with the community of Merafong from which 
opposition by various community structures were voiced against being incorp-
orated to the North West Province. A negotiating mandate was adopted in 
favour of what the majority in the community had expressed and in light of 
“impact assessment and analysis of the public hearing submissions”. 32
Subsequently, the Portfolio Committee met with the Legislature’s legal 
advis ors and then the Select Committee on Judicial and Constitutional Mat-
ters. As a result of those consultations the Gauteng Provincial Legislature 
deviated from the negotiating mandate in support of the Amendment Bill that 
included the Merafong Municipality in the North West Province. In the final 
mandate the Legislature sighted various reasons for the change.33
29 Merafong (fn 10 above).
30 Constitution Twelfth Amendment Bill 2005 and the Cross- Boundary Municipalities Laws and 
Repeal Related Matters Bill 2005.
31 The municipal area of Merafong described by Map No 5 of Schedule 1 to Notice 1998 of 2005 under 
the Province of North West.
32 The Portfolio Committee on Local Government –Gauteng “Committee Position at the Nego-
tiation Phase”
33 The Portfolio Committee on Local Government- Gauteng “Committee Position after Consider-
ation of Negotiating Mandates by the NCOP Select Committee”
 …
  If the veto of the Gauteng Province applies to the whole Constitution Bill as it relates to cross-
boundary municipalities, the Cross-Boundary Municipalities Repeal Bill will have to be withdrawn 
from Parliament, and the local government elections would be conducted within the current munici-
pal configuration, i.e. with cross-boundary municipalities.
  If the notion of a narrow interpretation is applied to the provisions of the Constitutional Bill which 
may be vetoed by a province, the implications are just as extensive as if the whole Constitution Bill is 
rejected. Let’s for argument sake say Gauteng can only veto (reject) the part of the proposed Schedule 
1A that defines its territory; it will mean that the authorisation to have cross-boundary municipalities 
is revoked, whilst the current boundary of Gauteng remains the same. The result of this would be that 
not only West Rand District but also Tshwane, Ekurhuleni and Metsweding would be affected. These 
municipalities (and their local municipalities where applicable) would have to be disestablished and 
those areas of the municipalities in question that fall in Gauteng. The crossboundary areas falling in 
the other provinces would likewise have to be redemarcated into the new municipalities.
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The issues before the court were: (i) was there sufficient public involve-
ment by the provincial legislatures? (ii) was the decision to exclude Merafong 
Municipality from Gauteng ( the change in the mandate) rational?
4.1 Reasonableness
The question of reasonableness surrounds the extent to the public was 
involved in the decision-making of the Gauteng Provincial Legislature. After 
receiving legal advice the legislature’s modus operandi changed, in that the 
legislature was informed that it can only vote “aye or nay” as it cannot amend 
the Bill to incorporate Merafong Municipality into Gauteng. The question 
arising is whether the legislature was acting reasonably when it did not go 
back and consult with the public after dramatic change in the circumstances. 
Van der Westhuizen J, for the majority, found that the previous decisions34 on 
which the applicants relied do not require an ongoing dialogue and that the 
conduct of the Gauteng Provincial Legislature (not going back to the public) 
only amounted to “discourteous conduct (which) does not equal uncon-
stitutional conduct which has to result in the invalidity of the legislation”35 
because in this case submissions and public hearings were held which pass 
the constitutional muster. Therefore the Court found no evidence that the 
Gauteng Legislature discharged its duty unreasonably.
The Appellants also contended that the legislature was never open to per-
suasion because the Minister had beforehand stated on a public website that 
Merafong Municipality would be incorporated into the North West Pro vince36 
and that decision was made before public participation took place and fur-
thermore, that is was due to political pressure that the Respondents were 
reluctant to provide reasons for their final mandate.37
The Court held that findings are based on the facts and evidence before it; it 
cannot make a finding on whether there was any political pressure.38
4.2 Rationality
The reasons given by the Portfolio Committee for the change in the mandate 
are based on the legal advice received from the state law advisors that a pro-
vince can only adopt or reject the Constitutional Bill in terms of section 74(8) 
of the Constitution and that no amendments can be affected in the NCOP. 
The reasons are the adverse implications of not supporting the Bill which the 
Committee said included the following: (i) the whole Bill would have to be 
withdrawn meaning local election would still be held under cross-boundary 
  The overall complication would be that the current boundaries of Gauteng are still determined 
with reference to magisterial districts, which are not used or referred to in the Constitution Twelfth 
Amendment Bill. Consequently, amendments that would be required in the Constitution Bill to address 
Gauteng’s position may be such that it would not be possible to finalise the bill for the Local Govern-
ment Elections, thus, elections would be conducted within the current municipal configuration.”
34 Doctors for Life International (fn 13 above) ; Matatiele 2 (fn 21 above). 
35 Merafong (fn 10 above) para 60.
36 Merafong (fn 10 above) para 47.
37 Ibid.
38 Merafong (fn 10 above) para 48.
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municipalities; (ii) even if the provincial legislature rejects only that part that 
deals with Gauteng’s territory, the effect would be just as extensive as other 
municipalities would be “disestablished”; and (iii) the Local Government 
Elections would be affected as Gauteng will still e determined in terms of 
magisterial districts. The Appellant sought to challenge the rationality of the 
Gauteng Provincial Legislature on two issues. First, the Gauteng Legislature 
acted irrational when it abandoned the mandate at the NCOP and voted 
Merafong into the North West Province.39 The Gauteng Provincial Legis-
lature acted irrationally because it failed to provide reasons for abandoning 
its mandate at the NCOP.40 Secondly, the Appellants argued that the decision 
is factually irrational because the incorporation of Merafong into the North 
West would adversely affect the lives of the Merafong community.41
The test for rationality is whether the exercise of public power is linked 
to a legitimate governmental purpose.42 The Court held, the Gauteng Pro-
vincial Legislature’s conduct was linked to a legitimate purpose of eliminating 
cross-boundary municipalities and the creation of viable and economically 
sustainable municipalities43 and therefore rational. The Court also noted that 
in keeping to separation of powers the judiciary should not substitute with 
their opinions what they do not agree from the legislature.44 According to 
the majority the obligation to facilitate public involvement does not mean 
that the public’s views will prevail.45 The judgement goes further to say that 
government cannot be expected to be bound by the wishes of the minority 
and that public participation should supplement elections and majority rule, 
and “not to conflict with or even overrule or veto them”46.
5. DISCUSSION
Looking at the reasonable test the factors against which reasonableness is 
judged are (i)the importance of the legislation to be passed, followed by (ii)
the impact the legislation will have on the public, it is difficult to understand 
why the Court found that is was not necessary for the Legislature to go back 
to the people of Merafong Municipality once circumstances under which they 
were consulting changed (by the advice from the legal experts). The impact 
of re-demarcation has adverse effects on the people’s fundamental rights47, as 
discussed by O’ Regan J in Matatiele 148, if the people directly affected are not 
meaningfully involved in the legislative process.
The failure to report back to the Merafong community does not according 
to majority rise to the level of unreasonableness which would result in the 
39 Merafong (fn 10 above) para 66.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Merafong (fn 10 above) para 63
43 Merafong (fn 10 above) para 96.
44 Merafong (fn 10 above) para 63
45 Merafong (fn 10 above) para 50.
46 Merafong (fn 10 above) para 26
47 S 21(3) of the Constitution. S 10 of the Constitution
48 Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (1) 2006 (5) 
BCLR 622 (CC) Matatiele 1
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invalidity of the Twelfth Amendment. From the previous decisions49 the duty 
to facilitate public involvement has been described as being central to our 
constitutional democracy. Sachs J said50 “in our country active and on going 
public involvement is a requirement of constitutional government in a legal 
sense”, thus, where the legislature makes a decision, and such decision does 
not correctly reflect what was deduced during the public participation proc-
ess, the legitimacy of legislation which flows from such a decision will be 
tainted. In Doctors for Life the Court also implied that when legislation is 
passed in a legitimate manner, the general public would be more accepting of 
such legislation.51 In the majority judgment the Court also said:
“Politicians, who are perceived to disrespect their voters or fail to fulfil promises without 
explanation, should be held accountable. A democratic system provides possibilities for 
this, one of which is regular elections”52.
The statement above does make sense; however, if public participation 
becomes an ineffective exercise the only time the public will be able to have 
a meaningful say in government is once every five years. And that goes 
against the constitutional principle that our democracy encompasses both 
representative and participatory democracy53.
6. CONCLUSION
One of the strengths of the Constitutional Court lies in its ability to safeguard 
and protect the dignity of minorities and the vulnerable. The fact that the test 
for reasonableness in the duty to facilitate public involvement has no pro-
cedural safeguards54 leaves the legislature with ample discretion to meet the 
just minimums set in both the rationality and the reasonableness tests. The 
minimalist approach to public participation has created a gap wide enough 
to let an important piece of legislation which has significant implications on 
the public to be passed as reasonable. Setting such low standards means that 
judicial review of the other branches of government is ineffective. This has 
resulted in what Sachs J once hinted;
“[I]t would be gravely unjust to suggest that the attention the Constitutional Assembly 
dedicated to promoting public involvement in law-making represented little more than a 
rhetorical constitutional flourish on its part”55.
The public will, according to the majority, have a meaningful say in the next 
election56.
49 Doctors for Life International (fn 13) and Matatiele 2 (fn 21)
50 Doctors for Life International (fn 13) para 231
51 Doctors for Life International (fn 13 above) para 205.
52 Merafong (fn 10 above) para 60
53 S 41(c) of the Constitution
54 Procedure for public involvement was suggested in King and Others v Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board 
of Control and Another 2006 (4) BCLR 462 (SCA). 
55 Doctors for Life International (fn 13 above) para 227.
56 Merafong (fn 10 above) para 60.
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